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‘Aristotle’s achievement then is wrongly understood if it is supposed that he offered us an account of justice and of practical reasoning which can be shown to be superior to those advanced from other rival, fundamentally different standpoints, ancient or modern, by appeal to some neutral set of standards, equally available to and equally compelling for the rational adherents of every standpoint. As I argued earlier, in laying out the grounds for disagreement and conflict which divide those whose allegiance is to the goods of excellence from those whose allegiance is to the goods of effectiveness, the disagreements between fundamental standpoints are in key part over how to characterise those disagreements. There is at this level no neutral mode of stating the problems, let alone the solutions.

Progress in rationality is achieved only from a point of view. And it is achieved when the adherents of that point of view succeed to some significant degree in elaborating ever more comprehensive and adequate statements of their positions through the dialectical procedure of advancing objections which identify incoherences, omissions, explanatory failures, and other types of flaws and limitation in earlier statements of them, of finding the strongest arguments available for supporting those objections, and then of attempting to restate the position so that it is no longer vulnerable to those specific objections and arguments.’

p. 144, – Whose Justice? Which Rationality? – Alasdair MacIntyre, 1988.